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[L. A. No. 22941.

In Bank.

Apr. 15,.1955.]

RALPH N. HIGHSMITH et al., Plaintiffs, v. 'MAX LAm
et al., Defendants; MORTON D. GOLDBERG et al.,
Respondents; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellant.
[la,lb] Internal Revenue-Federal Tax Lien.s.-Although by its
tax liens federal government acquires interest as coowner of
indebtedness of judgment debtor to taxpayer, its rights are
not greater than those of taxpayer wbose property is sought
to be levied on, nor greater than those which would be acquired by assignee of taxpayer.

[1] Federal tax liens, note, 105 A.L.R. 1244. See also Am.Jur.,
Internal Revenue, § 76 et seq.
McK. Dig. Referen.ces: [1, 5, 6] Internal Revenue; [2) Judgments, §§ 521, 534; [3, 4] Judgments, § 527.
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[2] Judgments -

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

Setoff - Effect ot' Assignment.-A judgment
debtor who has by assignment or otherwise become owner of
judgment against his judgment creditor may go into court in
which judgment against him was rendered and have his judgment offset against creditor's judgment.
Id-Setoff-Setoff of Claim Against Judgment.-Under Code
Civ. Proc., § 368, judgment debtor may set off claims against
creditor which were acquired after assignment of judgment
to third person but prior to notice to debtor of assignment.
Id.-Setoff-Setoff of Claim Against Judgment.-Actual notice
of assignment is necessary to defeat right of judgment debtor
to set off claims against creditor which were acquired after
assignment of judgment to third person.
Internal Revenue-Federal Tax Liens.-Right of setoff may
not be ignored in determining effect of federal tax liens on
claims against a debtor, and state law is controlling in determination of such rights.
ld.-Federal Tax Liens.-Where debtors against whom taxpayer obtained judgment have no notice of federal government's tax liens at time they acquire judgments against taxpayer, such judgments are properly set off against one in taxpayer's favor, and because of such setoffs there is no property
in such judgment debtors' possession against which tax liens
may be foreclosed, and no cause of act.ion against them for
personal judgment in favor of federal government.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Arthur Crum, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for declaratory relief, in which some defendants file
cross-complaint for similar relief. Judgment for cross-complainant Goldbergs and for cross-defendant Califurnia Department of Employment, affirmed.
Laughlin E. Waters, United States AttlJrney, and Edward
R. McHale, Assistant United States Attorney, for Appellant.
Maurice Rose for Respondents.
EDMONDS, J .-The question here presented for decision
concerns the scope and effect of notices of tax lien of the
United States of America. The appeal is from a judgment
holding that the federal government may not recover from
[2] Setoff as between judgments, note, 121 A.L.R. 478. See also
Oal.Jur., Judgments, § 269 et seq.; Am.Jur., Judgments, § 898
et seq.
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the judgment debtors of the taxpayer the amount stated in
those notices til b~ due for unpaid taxes, and also that it
has no right to money on deposit with the municipaJ court.
Max Lair sued Morton and Katherine Goldberg for money
assertedly due him upon a contract. After the commencement
of the action, but before Lair obtained judgment for approximately $4,000, the government filed its notices of tax lien.
Subsequently, and before they received actual notice of these
liens, the Goldbergs acquired, in the name of H. Markus.
four judgments against Lair evidencing a total indebtedness
by him of about $4,200.
Levies were made by each of Lair's judgment creditors,
or his assignee, upon the indebtedness evidenced by the judgment against the Goldbcrgs. 'rhe State also levied upon this
indebtedness claiming that Lair was delinquent in the payment of taxes. The GolUbergs then deposited $4,200 with the
marshal of the municipal court to the credit of Markus. This
deposit was made under an agreement between the Goldbergs and Markus whereby he was to collect the amount of it
from the marshal, less execution fees, and pay the balance
to them. In the present action the trial court found that the
Goldbergs made this deposit "in order to have the record
manifest their set-offs of their acquired four judgments
against said judgment in favor of Max Lair." Subsequently,
upon the motion of the Goldbergs, Lair's judgment against
them was satisfied of record.
The deposit is being held by the marshal pursuant to an
order of the court obtained by the plaintiffs in the present
suit who are alleged creditors of Lair. The prayer of the
complaint was for a money judgment against him, and a
declaration of the priorities of liens upon, and conflicting
claims to, the indebtedness represented by the judgment obtained by Lair against the Goldbergs.
By cross-complaint, the Goldbergs named the United States
of America as a cross-defendant. In its answer, the government asserted that it has first liens on the property of Lair.
It asked the court to enforce those liens upon any of Lair's
property held by GolUberg and, in particular, upon the deposit with the marshal. By way of cross-complaint against
the Goldbergs, the government demanded a personal judgment
against them. Only the government has appealed from the
judgment which declared, inter alia, that the government
never acquired any interest in the debt due from the Goldbergs to Lair, denied it the right to recover any amount
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against the Goldbergs and ordered that its cross-complaint be
dismissed.
The United States claims that after the notices of tax liens
were recorded, it had an interest in the Goldberg's debt to
Lair which could not be divested by any act of the debtors.
'!'he Goldbergs contend that the United States has no interest
in the deposit because the government's liens could only
extend to property of Lair. It is their position that the deposit was made to satisfy claims against Lair, and he had no
interest in it at any time. They also argue that the government is not entitled to a persona] judgment against them
because of their right of setoff against Lair and they had no
property belonging to him in their possession at the time of
the government's demand. Another point relied upon is that,
if the court erred in applying the principle of setoff, under
the rule of res judicata, the government is bound by the
order satisfying the judgment in Lair v. Goldberg. Finally,
they insist that no personal judgment can be rendered against
them under the provisions of section 3710(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code, because, at the time of the government's demand, any property of Lair which .they had in their possession had been levied upon by other creditors.
The Internal Revenue Code provides that if any person
liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
after demand, the amount, including any interest or penalty,
shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property
and rights to property, belonging to such person. (26 U.S.C.,
1946 ed., § 3670.) The lien shall not be valid as against any
mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until
notice thereof has been duly filed in the office of the county
recorder of the county within which the property subject
to the lien is situated. (26 U.S.C., 1940 ed., 1953 Pocket
Supp., § 3672 (a) (1); Cal. Gov. Code, § 27330.)
In the event of the nonpayment of the amount of taxes
claimed, the collector may levy upon all property and rights
to property (with certain exceptions not here pertinent)
belonging to such person, or on which the lien provided in
section 3670 exists, for the payment of the sum due. (26
U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 3692.)
Sectio.D 3710 of the Internal Revenue Code reads: "Any
person in possession of property, or rights to property, subject to distraint, upon which a levy has been made, shall,
upon demand by the collector or deputy collector making such
levy, surrender such property or rights to such collector or
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deputy, unless such property or right is, at the time of such
demand, subject to an attachment or execution under any
judicial process.
"Any person who fails or refuses to so surrender any
of such property or rights shall be lia.ble in his own person
and estate to the United States in a sum equal to the value
of the property or rights not so surrendered, but not exceeding the amount of the taxes (including penalties and
interest) for the collection of which such levy has been made,
together with costs and interest from the date of such levy."
(26 U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 3710.)
[la] Although by its liens the government acquired an
interest as coowner of the indebtedness of Goldberg to Lair
(United States v. Oity of Greenville, 118 F.2d 963), its rights
are not greater than those of the taxpayer whose property
is sought to be levied upon. (United States v. Winnett, 165
F.2d 149, 151; accord: Karno-Smith 00. v. Maloney, 112
F.2d 690, 692; United States v. Graham, 96 F.Supp. 318, 321.)
" 'The proposition here laid down is in harmony with the
generally recognized principle that the rights of the garnisher
do not rise above, or extent beyond, those of his debtor;
that the garnishee shall not, by operation of the proceedings
against him, be placed in any worse condition than he would
have been in, had the principal debtor's claim been enforced
against him directly; that the liability, legal and equitable,
of the garnishee to the principal debtor, is a measure of his
liability to the attaching creditor, who takes the shoes of the
principal debtor, and can assert only the rights of the latter.'
•.. It would be most unfair that a third person, merely by
reason of his interposition, whether he was a sovereign or
not, should be able to change the rights inter sese between the
obligor of the chose in action and his obligee, who is the objective of the levy or attachment." (United States v. Bank of
United States, 5 F.Supp. 942, 945.)
[2] In California, "a judgment debtor who has, by assignment or otherwise, become the owner of a judgment or claim
against his judgment creditor, may go into the court in which
the judgment against him was rendered and have his judgment offset against the first judgment. . . . [3] Under section
368 of the Code of Civil Procedure l the debtor may set off
ICode of Civil Procedure section 368: "In the case of an assignment
of a thing in action, the action by the assignee is without prejudice to
any set-off, or other defense existing at the time of, or before, notice of
the assignment; ••• "
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claims against the creditor which were acquired after the
assignment of the judgment to a third person but prior to
notice to the debtor of the assignment. . . . [T] here is no
room for the exercise of discretion upon this question."
(Harrison v. Adams, 20 Ca1.2d 646, 649 [128 P.2d 9] ; also
see: Haskins v. Jordan, 123 Cal. 157 [55 P. 786].) [4] Actual
notice is necessary to defeat this right. (See McCabe v.
Grey, 20 Cal. 509.) [lb] The rights acquired by the government as coowner of the debt never were greater than those
which would have been acquired by an assignee of Lair.
In United States v. Bank of Shelby, 68 F.2d 538, the
government brought an action for penalties against the bank
for refusal to surrender $3,500. the amount of the deposit
of one Toler, a delinquent taxpayer. The government had assessed Toler for income taxes in March. In June, the Collector served upon the bank a notice of lien for the taxes
and a warrant of distress, claiming thereby to have levied on
the deposit of Toler. Just prior to the levy, Toler, to meet
the claims of creditors, borrowed $10,000 from the bank,
giving a mortgage on his plantation.
When Toler was unable to settle with his creditors, he
and the bank agreed that, from the proceeds of the loan, he
would pay the bank $6,500, the amount due to it upon his
past due unsecured notes in its favor. The remaining $3,500
was credited to his account. It was held that the bank had a
clear right to offset the $3,500 against the $10,000 note. At
the time of the levy, said the court, "there was no property
or right to property of Toler which Toler could assert and
consequently nothing which the tax could take a lien on or
the tax officer could rightfully demand possession of." (P.
539.) The fact that the $10,000 note and the $3,500 deposit
both stemmed from the same transaction was discussed, but
was not considered to be the controlling factor in the case.
The government cites United States v. Winnett, 165 F.2d
149, and United States v. Graham, 96 F.Supp. 318, as supporting its position. In the first case, the court upheld the
right of setoff which Winnett obtained prior to the date the
lien was claimed. The decision does not bar a right of setoff
which is obtained before actual notice of tax lien, but after
the lien is recorded. In the Graham case, no consideration
was given to the statutes and decisions relating to rights of
setoff. In that case, the lien of the federal government was
upheld solely upon the basis of its rights against the taxpayer.
[5] The right of setoff may not be ignored in determining the
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effect of tax liens on the claims against a debtor and the state
law is controlling in a determination of those rights. (KarnoSmith 00. v. Maloney, 112 F.2d 690, 692.)
[6] The Goldbergs had no notice of the federal government's
liens at the time they acquired the judgments against Lair,
and those judgments were properly setoff against the one in
favor of Lair. Because of those setoffs there is no property
in the possession of the Goldbergs against which the tax liens
may be foreclosed, and no cause of action against them for a
personal judgment. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to
discuss other defenses against the claims of the United States.
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
On February 8, 1950, Lair brought an action against the
Goldbergs and on March 26, 1951, he secured a judgment for
$4,144.22. In the meantime, on April 13, 1950, and July 26,
1950, the United States filed notices of tax liens against Lair
in Los Angeles County. Thereafter the Goldbergs purchased
three judgments against Lair and another claim against him
that was subsequently reduced to judgment. None of these
judgments were entered, however, until after the notices of
the tax liens were filed. Had Lair's creditors sought to enforce
their claims against Lair instead of selling them to the Goldbergs, they could not have reached Lair's claim against the
Goldbergs until the tax liens had been satisfied. (United
States v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 50-51 [71
8.Ct. 111, 95 L.Ed. 53]; United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211
[75 S.Ct. 239, 99 L.Ed. - - ] ; United States v. Liverpool &
Londo'll &7 Globe Ins. 00., 348 U.S. 215 [75 S.Ct. 247, 99
L.Ed. --].) In such case, the United States would have
been free to enforce its liens against Lair's property by collecting the judgment in his favor against the Goldbergs.
The question presented, therefore, is whether the Goldbergs
can defeat this right of the United States by purchasing claims
against Lair that but for the purchase would be subordinate
to the tax liens. In my opinion, they cannot do so.
It is true that the Goldbergs did not have actual knowledge
of the tax liens at the time they purchased the claims against
Lair and that in the absence of federal legislation their right
to setoff would not be prejudiced by an assignment without
notice of the judgment against them. (Harrison v. Adamr,
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20 Ca1.2d 646, 649 [128 P.2d 9]; Code Civ. Proc., § 368.)
It bears emphasis, however, that the Goldbergs did not pay
their judgment creditor without notice of the tax liens against
him. Instead, they purchased claims against th~ir creditor
that were subordinate, whether they knew it or not, to the
tax liens, and there is no reason why these claims should have
greater value against the United States in the Goldbergs'
hands than they had in the hands of the Goldbergs' assignors.
Citing Karno-Smith Co. v. Maloney, 112 F.2d 690, United
States v. Winnett, 165 F.2d 149, United States v. Bank of
Shelby, 68 F.2d 538, United States v. Graham, 96 F.Supp.
318, and United States v. Bank of United States, 5 F.Supp.
42, the majority opinion holds, however, that the right to
setoff must be determined by state law and that the Goldbergs
may not be placed in a worse position toward their creditor
because the United States has intervened. The cited cases
considered situations in which the right to setoff arose before
the tax liens were perfected or in which the delinquent taxpayer at no time held an enforcible claim against his alleged
debtor. It is settled, however, that once the tax lien has been
perfected it may not be displaced by operation of state law
(Michigan v. United States, 317 U.S. 338, 340 [63 8.Ct. 302,
87 L.Ed. 312]; United States v. City of New Britain, 347
U.S. 81, 84 [74 8.Ct. 367, 98 L.Ed. 520]; United States v.
Snyder, 149 U.S. 210, 214 [13 8.Ct. 846, 37 L.Ed. 705]) and
that the interests of the United States may not be prejudiced
by the assertion of subsequently acquired rights of third
parties against the tax delinquent. (United States v. Security
Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 50-53 [71 8.Ct. 111, 95 L.Ed.
53]; Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 267268 [66 S.Ct. 108, 90 L.Ed. 56]; United States v. City of
Greenville, 118 F.2d 963, 965; Miller v. Bank of America, 166
F.2d 415, 417 i Citizens State Bank of Barstow v. Vidal, 114
F.2d 380, 383-384; In re Dartmont Coal Co., 46 F.2d 455,
457; United States v. Graham, 96 F.Supp. 318, 321, affirmed,
195 F.2d 530; United States v. Rosenfield, 26 F.Supp. 433,
436.)
The fact that the Goldbergs did not have actual knowledge
. of the tax liens when they purchased the claims against Lair
does not render the enforcement of the tax liens against them
inequitable. The Goldbergs' indebtedness to Lair was an asset
that the United States was entitled to levy upon for the payment of taxes due. As noted above, the Goldbergs did not
pay the judgment in ignorance of the tax liens but instead

......
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purchased claims against Lair. That the value of these claims
was problematical was apparent from the fact that Lair'B
creditors were willing to sell them for approximately one
third of their face value and the Goldbergs could easily have
determined from an examination of the records that they
were subordinate to the tax liens. Under these circumstances
it cannot reasonably be said that the United States attempted
to prejudice the Goldbergs' position toward their creditor
by asserting its tax liens. Instead, because they failed to investigate the sources of information available to them, the
Goldbergs have been permitted to succeed in defeating the
enforcement of the tax liens by advancing claims that were
subordinate to them.
Gibson, O. J., concurred.
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